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Abstract. A brief retrospective on economic thought reveals that, 
in the quest for the scientific status of their research, economists had to 
refine not only their research methods, but even the economic language 
itself. The use and, sometimes, the abuse of the “positive” concept in 
present economic discourse are clear proofs that the constant changes of 
economic language mark significantly economic science. Coined by 
Auguste Comte, who denied the very existence of economic science, the 
“positive” concept has become for a significant part of economists a key-
term that guarantees and emphasizes the scientific status of their 
research. Alternatively, an important body of scholars seems to provide a 
different meaning for this concept and uses it in order to reveal economic 
facts, more precisely, economic growth. One who is not very familiar 
with the methodology of economics might be confused by these different 
meanings hidden in a single term. In this context, the present paper aims 
to bring more light into this issue by providing both an epistemological 
analysis of “positive” term and a sketch of spreading patterns of this 
concept via scientific publications. Consequently, the research follows 
two major well-defined paths: 1) the epistemological analysis of various 
meanings related to the “positive” term and 2) the quantitative study of 
occurrences in which this concept is used and cited in economic journals 
with high ISI citation index. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After two hundred fifty years since the founding the economic science 
and after a millenary history of economic ideas, a very large part of the 
economists seem more and more certain that they found in the qualitative 
analysis the right path of the economic science identity and the unravel of the 
epistemological mystery of multilateral way of thinking and of the research 
methods. The systematic spread of ideas according to which the economist has 
to convey to empirical rules that help organize the knowledge and the research 
in the so called “tough” sciences does not mean anything else than submitting 
to the requirements of the “positive economy” or even the “normative” one, 
shifting the scientific interest towards “what it is” and obviously towards “what 
it should be”. This great controversy in the economic science appeared almost 
two centuries ago between the “quantitativists”  and the “explicationists”. 
Positivists conviction in the power of the quantitative modeling to change the 
economic orientation goes beyond any doubt even when the “explicationists” 
asks: What is noticed and what is actually measured? 
The obsessively repeated economic concepts associated with the positive 
term show the high frequency of the words “positive economy”. The term 
“positive economy” comes from the spreading of the influence of positivism on 
all areas of knowledge. In the intellectual history of ideas, the detailed analysis 
of positivism made by Theodor Ruyssen reveals a set of trends in thinking 
which consider that only the analysis and knowing the real facts verified by 
experience can explain the phenomena of the sensorial world. The followers of 
positivism invoke the certainty given exclusively by the scientific experience, 
they reject introspection, intuition or any other form of metaphysical approach 
that could explain understanding the phenomena. In the 19
th century, the 
positivism, as a logic empiricism, spread across all fields of knowledge 
including the economic one. 
In this context, the purpose of this paper is, on one hand, to analyze the 
meanings given to the term “positive” in the various epistemological currents 
that have found their echo in the economic science and, on the other hand, to 
conduct a quantitative study on the occurrences of  the positive term as 
“positive theory” and  of the couple “positive-normative” in the journal The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics and The Journal of Economic Literature in 
order to estimate the frequency of  the use of this term and also the common 
contexts in which it is used. 
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2. The positivist current in economy 
 
2.1. Social positivism 
 
Positivism was launched in the scientific community by Auguste Comte, 
initially in the form of scientific positivism, and since 1847 until the end of his 
life, he oriented positivism towards the “new law of humanity” with his own 
“religion” (Marietti Kremer, 1997). Auguste Comte, as every utopian from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, dreamed of a society based on unified 
science, on positive science. In the particular manner of the Encyclopedia-tists, 
Auguste Comte suggests a holistic research program and an ad hoc structure of 
sciences: “the positive philosophy includes five or six sciences: mathematics, 
astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology” (Comte, 1910, p. 18). 
The place that each science has in the hierarchy depended on the fulfilment of 
certain criteria, such as: the degree of accuracy, the degree of objectivity, the 
degree of historical priority, the degree of precision and the degree of certainty. 
A study subject  can be considered a science if there is a class of homogeneous 
phenomena, if they met the criteria of relevance and if the related phenomena 
could be researched using the positive method (observation, experience and 
measurement). Therefore, in this set given by Auguste Comte, the economic 
science did not take place because it did not meet the requirements to access the 
set of sciences. Auguste Comte went further to introduce the Discourssur 
l'ensemble dupositivism, exposes the manner in which the “Positive Philosophy 
decomposes in social philosophy and natural philosophy, the latter being a 
fundamental preamble of the former, the only object defining our real 
speculations” (Comte, 1848). “The positive political system” envisioned by 
Auguste Comte was founded on laws, among which the “positive theory of 
accumulation” was primordial.  Resulted from the combination of subjective 
law – “every man can produce more than he or she consumes” – and one 
objective, “certain assets can be preserved beyond the time necessary for their 
reproduction” (Comte, 1851), the “positive accumulation theory” gives one of 
the meanings of the term “positive economics”, the one of economic growth”. 
The positive political system” generates “positive economics” and “social 
organism” guided by a “positivist spirit”, whose training lays in the hands of the 
encyclopedia education resulted from the Comtian set of sciences in order to 
ensure social solidarity. To achieve social solidarity, Comte analyzes the 
principles which determine social cohesion convinced that the social balance of 
the planet depended on the economic and social conditions of “social organism” Angela Rogojanu, George Şerban-Oprescu 
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(Comte, 1848, p. 35). Auguste Comte's conclusion holds the historical method 
of identifying the interaction between different aspects of a society at a certain 
moment in time, a method that will become the symbol of historical schools of 
economic thought in the nineteenth century and of the famous “fight for 
method”. The positive economics has found its pillars in the historical method 
of illustrating with facts using the description. Therefore, the interest for 
positive economy was caused by the expansion of historical schools, seeking a 
remedy to the “anemia” of economics, whose promoters were attacking hard the 
classics, especially “the gap between economic theory and economic reality.” 
To a greater or lesser extent, all the great economists of the nineteenth 
century engaged in economic emancipation of moral and political science have 
been touched by the positivist “virus”. The first condition for the scientific 
understanding of the economic phenomena was the objectivity of the theoretical 
speech of the economic science and the axiological neutrality. To achieve that 
the economists had to forget the empirical past and the ideological context 
specific to the first scientific economic research. The attempt to empower the 
economics was strongly contested by Auguste Comte and by his English, 
German and French followers (Gide, Rist, 1926, pp. 525-526). Criticism was 
focused particularly on the impossibility to isolate the economic fact derived 
from a social organism solidarity. Thus, Comte and his followers denied the 
possibility of an economic science on behalf of that very intimate solidarity 
between different aspects of the “social organism” (Comte, 1910, pp. 274-294). 
Comte's positivist vision seemed to be revived in the mid twentieth 
century when an economist, Milton Friedman, made even the followers of 
quantitative analysis startle with his Essays in Positive Economics (1953), 
where, quoting Marshall, he sustained: “the ultimate goal of a positive science 
is the development of a «theory» or a «hypothesis» that provides valid and 
meaningful predictions (meaning irreducible to truisms) about yet unobserved 
phenomena. Such a theory is, in general, a complex mix of two elements. On 
one hand, it is a “language” intended to promote “systematic and organized 
methods of reasoning” and, on the other hand, it is a set of hypotheses with 
empirical content designed to abstract essential features of a complex realities” 
(Friedman, 1953). The wave of confusion and protest against such manner of 
treating economic science could not be stopped not by the withdrawals of 
Friedmann or by the prestige that he has gained. However, Milton Friedman's 
Essay  is one of the few explicit and under taken reactions to the Comtian 
positivism. The positivist vision analysts, as Angèle Kremer Marietti, gave an Meanings and spreading patterns of the “positive” concept in economic thought 
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equivocal verdict: “Basically, Milton Friedman presents a positive episte-
mology identical to that of Comte. Also, Friedman fully agrees with Auguste 
Comte, when he values a theory on its predictive power for the class of 
phenomena whom it allegedly explains, because the prediction confirms the 
explanation” (Kremer Marietti, 1997). 
 
2.2. The Austrian approach  
 
In a world of science dominated by positivism, the “research program” 
introduced by Carl Menger brought clarity in how to deal with economic science. 
Indeed, sciences have something in common, but also differ: some deal with 
material nature and other with human nature; the first ones derive their 
knowledge retrospective from experience, the latter’s do so a priori, in other 
ways than empirical. The sources of inspiration, sometimes confusing, have led 
the historians of economic thought towards interesting arguments, but rather 
uncertain. Mark Blaug, for instance, has enough courage to say: “This leads us to 
a seek general movement in philosophy or social sciences which have 
emphasized the introspection as a tool for making assumptions about economic 
behavior. Some authors were shocked be the revival of the Kantian philosophy in 
the mid-century, starting from Germany and then expanding across the continent. 
Back then, the “Back to introspection and the meaning of impression” was the 
slogan of the philosophical current” (Blaug, 1992, p. 335). Anyway, the efforts of 
Carl Menger and his followers were orientated towards two major directions 
defining the “Austrian research program”: on the one hand, to develop a quality 
economic theory, on the other hand, to identify the method of economic science. 
In this context, as Böhm-Bawerk noted, “many of the Austrian economists 
writings were devoted to the dispute over the method: among them, the study of 
Carl Menger – Untersuchungüber die Methodeder Sozialwissenschaften (The 
study on the method of social science) – made the first thorough going and 
detailed analysis about the issues under discussion. It should be noted in this 
context that the “exact” method or, as I prefer to say, the “isolation” method is by 
no means purely speculative and non-empirical, but rather, this method always 
seeks and finds its foundation in experience” (Böhm-Bawerk, 1891). Indeed, in 
the  Economic principles Carl Menger reiterated the idea after which the 
economic phenomena are, firstly, phenomena of human nature, and the economic 
science is a a priori science, thus innovating where others preferred the inertia of 
our “parents” tradition of economic science. Consequently, prior to the research 
of quantitative relations, the economic science imperative was knowing human Angela Rogojanu, George Şerban-Oprescu 
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nature of economic phenomena, because “all things are subject to the law of 
cause and effect. This great principle knows no exception and we would looking 
vain for an opposite example in the field of experience” (Menger, 1994, p. 5). 
The correspondence of that time reveals the firmness with which Carl 
Menger promoted his research program, but also the reservation to the 
enthusiasm to the mathematical formalization shared by the followers of 
measurement. Convinced of the relevance of measurement and formalization, 
Blaug cites such a situation: “in a letter addressed to Walras in 1884, Menger 
insisted that “mathematics cannot help the economist find the quantitative 
essence of the phenomena such as value, rent and profit” (Blaug, 1992, p. 331). 
The wickedness of Blaug's observation, that “this attitude has remained 
characteristic of Austrian writers who went so far as avoiding the need for 
mutual simultaneous determination of all economic variables” (Blaug, 1992,  
p. 331), does nothing but deepen doubts about the non-mathematical approaches. 
The short psychology involved by the new economic way of thinking 
placed at the center of research not only a new fundamental theory – the theory 
of final utility – but a living subject – the individual – whose behaviour draw 
lines after which the economy moved. However, focusing the economic 
analysis on the human experience, on the individual preferences and choices 
emphasized the demarcation of the “Austrianism” from other economic 
concepts, particularly from those called objectives. However, Carl Menger 
remained to a considerable extent tributary of the intellectual heritage 
oscillating in the research field demarcation of economy between production of 
goods and individual behaviour regarding the property. His disciples followed 
the research program, but abstained to charge the disaccords in the master’s 
account, accepting them as quasi-mandatory passages of the “childhood 
economic science”. This made Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk to change the 
scientific registry regarding the positive theory of capital and interest. In other 
words, why is the interest rate positive? Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk answer sends 
us to the production experience accumulated by people in time and to the time 
preference, meaning to the marginal utility theory (Böhm-Bawerk, 1959). 
 
2.3. Eclectic positivism  
 
Alfred Marshall, for the first time in the history of economic thought, made 
a synthesis of classicism, the German historical school and marginalism, arguing 
that observation and experience are needed to determine the immediate and Meanings and spreading patterns of the “positive” concept in economic thought 
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subsequent effects of different groups of causes, which meant that economic 
science was founded, in his view, on a positive review. In this context, Alfred 
Marshall argued for economic analysis using empirical method, which is 
consistent with the mission of economics and “the role of science was to 
assemble, collate, analyze economic facts and use knowledge obtained from 
observation and experience” (Marshall, 1890). Fixing a heterogeneous theoretical 
framework demands a proper vision of reality: economic laws should be 
understood as trends showed only “what is” (positive view), without showing 
“what should be” (normative vision), so without ethical conditions (Gélédan, 
1988, p. 115). However, Marshall gave way to value judgments when he focused 
on the end purpose of economics, especially on its ability to solve practical 
problems and to establish standards of economy “economic laws and judgments 
are only part of the material that the consciousness of people and their common 
sense use to solve practical problems and to establish rules that can serve as a 
guide to life” (Marshall, 1890). Instead of homo oeconomicus schematized, 
Alfred Marshall introduces the idea of behaviors that were very different, but 
which should avoid excessive simplification: “instead of business activities, 
performed with power and skill, there is a continuous gradation based on 
calculations designed for along time, while ordinary people do not have the 
power or the will to direct their interests as businessmen” (Marshall, 1890). 
Therefore, economists “dealt with man as he was, not an abstract or economic 
man, but a man in flesh and blood” (Marshall, 1890).  If the economist studies 
especially how man pursues its own gain, this does not mean that he tries in this 
way to reduce the economy to a “natural history of selfishness” for the simple 
reason that this behavior can be expressed in monetary terms, the effects are 
scientifically affordable in comparison with philanthropy, vanity and sense of 
duty (Marshall, 1890). Overcoming the mechanical complex, but not the 
evolutionist temptation, Alfred Marshall created a scientific product that quickly  
imposed on the market of ideas which dominated economic thinking until up to 
John Maynard Keynes. As noted by some analysts, from edition to edition, the 
Principles were “retouched” according to the author's desire to better reflect his 
thinking. At the same time, one can notice a polishing of economic philosophy of 
Alfred Marshall, “the preface to the first edition is dependent on the continuity 
principle expressed by the motto «Natura non facit saltum» as an element of 
linkage throughout the book. Looking through the Principles one may notice «the 
fundamental idea», i.e. the idea of «general theory of supply and demand 
balance»” (Blaug, 1992, p. 430). Instead, as Blaug notes in the preface to the Angela Rogojanu, George Şerban-Oprescu 
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eighth edition, the author “brings a note of apology to the static nature of the 
analysis of the Principles. Despite the frequent use of the idea of «ceteris 
paribus», Marshall points out that the key element of his book is dynamics and 
not statics. Even if so, statics and dynamics do not represent the entire economy, 
«the Mecca of the economist is based more on economic biology rather than 
economic dynamics»” (Blaug, 1992, p. 431). At the same time, one cannot draw 
out marginalism from the work of Alfred Marshall for the simple reason that “the 
margin concept that determines the price has gained increasing importance in the 
Principles  and once with it, it was revealed that margin varies against the 
conditions of the problem under discussion and especially with period of time 
referred to” (Blaug, 1992, p. 431). 
 
2.4. Deductive positivism 
 
The status of economic science, denied by Auguste Comte and put to 
doubt by skeptics, as well as the preference of many for sociology based on 
positivist criteria have led to serious epistemologic disputes, “yet not until 
Pareto’s writings would one be able to find the most consistent analysis of the 
articulation of economics and sociology, as well as the most refined 
theorization of methodologis correlations between the two disciplines” 
(Passeron, 2004). 
Vilfredo Pareto was not only the successor of Léon Walras la Lausanne, 
but also the one who continued many of the latter’s ideas. To formalize and 
translate into mathematics economic theories were not enough to counter the 
accuses of historists directed towards traditional economists (including here 
Pareto). In the context of the controversis on method, Vilfredo Pareto (1896, 
1906) brings clarifications on the nature of economic science: “There are two 
main categories of sciences: the ones that, like physiscs, chemistry, mechanics, 
may revert to experience, and the ones like weather forecast, astronomy, 
political economy which cannot or may be able with great difficulty revert to 
experience, and are therefore content to observe” (Pareto, 1919). Yet, in the 
perspective of Vilfredo Pareto, political economy, the economic science, 
respectively, described a gradual structure of research essentialized in the two 
forms: first, Pure political economics, which, like physiscs or mathematics, 
ensured a first approximation of phenomena and of the general conditions for 
balance and had own research ways – progressive reconstruction of reality 
(Gélédan, 1988, p. 155). The method employed by Pareto corresponded to his Meanings and spreading patterns of the “positive” concept in economic thought 
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scientific objective of identifying the research domain of Applied political 
economics and implied analysis and synthesis, as well as rational route from 
simple to complex, from concrete to abstract, borrowing  from history and 
sociology; this was supposed to offer essence to Pure economics. Thus “Pareto 
was, probably, the founder of an explicit positivist approach in economics” 
(Rothbard, 1956, p. 231). 
The advantage created by Pareto revealed a science emancipated not only 
by morality, but also by politics; the new “face” of economic science uncovered 
a purely deductive and non-ideological type of economics, where the laws of 
natural economy dictated the order. Very much aware of the importance of 
economics’ various implications, Vilfredo Pareto saw economics as a mechanic 
assembly which only functioned if provided with necessary support:  “Human 
society appears ... as a giant aggregate of molecules, that provides service, 
consumes products and has restrictions in spending, of centers or glandes where 
economies transform into capital, and products change ones into others...” 
(Gélédan, 1988, p. 160). Past the dispute related to the subtlety of endeavor on 
the ideologic neutral, the Paretian theory seemed to gain ground be this only for 
this advantage. As some economic thought analysts observed: “Thus defined, 
political economics became purely deductive, that is, it proposed to deduce all 
consequence from data: initial constraints and goals the society had. Observing true 
behavior of agents was replaced by rationality postulate” (Grellet, 1979, p. 32). 
The history of economic thought retained only momentarily Pareto’s argument, 
political economics from a technique considered universal seemed to halt into 
autism that diluted the consistency of economic thought. Unfortunately, 
economic science depended too much, and still depends today, on the academic 
intellectual trend of the time, generator of enthusiasm for change. Yet, too 
much change can generate doubt over scientific seriousness and economic 
science may lose credibility. The controversies over initial data, scope and 
means have continued and do not seem to have ended, unless if something hard 
to suppose, economists would accept, without exception, without further 
addings, without corrections, without further developments, a common point of 
view on economic science. The Paretian viewpoint has dominated through 
logical simplicity until the fourth decade of the 20th century, although reference 
to Paretian arguments have been made directly or indirectly every time 
economics is confronted with a tough situation.  
Pareto’s endeavor highlights the progress in economic science, but also 
the epistemological difficulty, that had not yet been surpassed, that of “cutting Angela Rogojanu, George Şerban-Oprescu 
	
92 
out” the economic phenomenon from the global social fact without alteration or 
modification. Israel Kirzner, in agreement with other renowned authors, drew 
attention to the risks of changing research method on the go: “When the nature 
of economics is defined in this way, by the analysis of a unique general element 
in our consciousness to which only the term “economy” corresponds, then it 
must seem very obvious indeed that faulty definitions can seriously distort the 
character of the science. And when the analysis of this element has been made 
possible only by virtue of familiarity with the substantive content of the science 
itself, then its formulation into a definition can clearly take on the character of a 
positive scientific contribution” (Kirzner, 1996, pp. 10-11). There are at least 
two rules of economic research raised from the controversies around 
methodological issues – to isolate to analyze and to abstract to understand. The 
first requires a thorough knowledge of economic theory, second, to identify 
human actions that ensure a balance between “facts of the human nature and the 
external world” (Kirzner, 1996, p. 13). However, the increasing interde-
pendence among sciences reveals more than just the need for boundaries 
between different areas of knowledge. It also shows the common issues 
between different sciences and that they all converge to a common 
epistemological point – scientific truth. Perhaps the actions of the two great 
authors – Léon Walras, and respectively, Vilfredo Pareto – to divide research 
from economics could be understood from this point of view. Still a question 
remains: In fact, how many economics we are dealing with? 
 
2.5. Logical positivism 
 
Rooted in European philosophical tradition of empiricism, logical 
positivism is one of the most widely spread and controversial epistemological 
school of the early twentieth century. Its main aim is to identify the extent to 
which knowledge has a genuine scientific meaning. In this context, scientific 
knowledge is only mediated by experience and uses assumptions which have a 
cognitive significance; this kind of knowledge can be enriched either by 
observation or by logical analysis. According to logical positivism, there are 
only to types of statements that comply with cognitive significance criterion: 
analytic statements (tautologies and self-contradictions which can be found in 
any scientific language) and synthetic statements (assumptions related to facts 
which may be verified by observation). On the other hand, all other statements 
that do not fall into one of the above categories may be considered Meanings and spreading patterns of the “positive” concept in economic thought 
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metaphysical, they are neither true nor false and, although they describe 
significant daily individual’s behavior, they are placed outside of the scientific 
method. 
Consequently, logical positivism requires that all scientific knowledge to 
follow this rule: there is a direct relationship between a statement and empirical 
observation. On the other hand, scientists found difficult to apply this rule in 
daily practice and they never missed a chance to highlight the vulnerabilities 
and limits of positivist approach which gradually eroded its basic assumptions. 
Despite all these difficulties, a part of the undeniable achievements of 
contemporary epistemology, such as hypothetic-deductive or nomologic-
deductive models, were accomplished by logical positivism approach. 
Moreover, logical positivism seems to have drawn three specific research 
directions in the field of epistemology: demarcation criterion, the nature of 
scientific explanation and the growth of scientific knowledge. Also the most 
important contemporary epistemological theories started by challenging 
specific assumptions of positivism. This is the case of Popper’s falsificationism, 
Khun’s theory, Lakatos theory of research programs or Feyerabnd’s 
epistemological anarchism. 
Logical positivism made its way in economics mostly through Terence 
Hutchison paper, The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory, 
which was published in 1938, a time when economics gone through deep 
reconfiguration triggered by the Great Depression and the new theory of 
Keyenes. The very ambitious goal of Hutchinson's work is not only to restore 
the real scientific character of economics, but also to lay the foundations of 
modern economics. In Hutchinson's view, which is consistent with the positivist 
approach, any science is about real facts, thus all scientific statements are about 
an existing and observable reality. Economics was diverted from this path by 
the assumptions and abstract methods of traditional microeconomics. 
Following logical positivism tradition, Hutchinson identifies and 
classifies three types of possible economic statements: 1) deductive inferences 
which are pure theoretical assertions equivalent to analytic statements of 
positivist approach, they imply that a fact is necessary logical consequence of 
another; 2) empirical inferences are specific to applied theory and they are 
equivalent to synthetic statements of positivist approach, the sestatements imply 
that the value of truth of the hypothesis is determined by empirical observation 
while the conclusion follows logically from hypothesis; 3) inductive statements 
are drawn based on repeated observation of a phenomenon and imply that even Angela Rogojanu, George Şerban-Oprescu 
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though, logically, a sentence may be false, its falsity is actually a case so rare 
that it can be ignored. 
Providing a brief analysis of these types of statements, Hutchinson 
assumes that only inductive inferences could provide the scientific character of 
a discipline whereas deductive statements are tautologies emptied by any 
empirical content that does not provide the link between science and observable 
reality. Although deductive statements seem to refer to facts, they are language 
constructs which only render relations between definitions and not between real 
facts (Hutchinson, 1938, p. 30). In addition, Hutchinson blames the excessive 
use of ceteris paribus assumption in economics which scarifies any unknown 
observation for a logical solution with no empirical content (Hutchinson, 1938, 
p. 42). Although deductive statements are not scientific statements this does not 
mean that they are useless. Their pragmatic objective is to create a clear 
language that allows an effective approach to economic facts. On the other 
hand, the real scientific assumptions are the statements that can be directly 
tested or, otherwise, can be reduced to simple sentences that can be subject to 
these tests. These tests are not intended to give a final verdict on the truth value 
of the sentence, but only to establish empirical consequences of designated truth 
values derived from these empirical statements (Hutchinson, 1938, pp. 9-10). 
In the framework of the newly created methodology, Hutchinson launches 
some aggressive critics against traditional economy highlighting the lack of 
empirical content of the basic assumptions of traditional theories and the misuse 
of introspection (psychological approach) as an economic method while he 
further promotes the need for a frequent usage of more developed empirical 
methods in economics. Moreover, Hutchinson reverses the assumption 
traditional economy in which logic is above observation and provides a new 
standard for economic science: the only scientific laws are inductive inferences 
that, even though can be logically falsified, they were never falsified in practice 
(Hutchinson, 1938, p. 64).  
In the view of logical positivism transferred into economics via 
Hutchinson, the positive character of a theory consists in its ability to operate 
with statements derived from empirical observations that are confirmed in as 
many cases as possible. The confirmation tests consist in applying more 
complex statistical and econometric techniques. Purely deductive statements are 
not excluded from economics, but they are only an interface between reality 
and theory that allows a formalized approach to economic facts. 
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3. Analysis of “positive” concept occurrences  
 
3.1. Research methodology 
 
The research was based on papers published in two significant economic 
journals:  The Quarterly Journal of Economics and Journal of Economic 
Literature. These two journals were selected considering the mainly theoretical 
content of articles accepted for publication and relative influence score held by 
the two journals. Thus, according to the classification in January 2012 the first 
three journals on the economy are: 
Table 1 
Main scientific journals in economics 
Nr. 
crt. 
The review  ISSN Relative 
impact 
factor 
(Journal) 
Reference 
influence 
score 
(Field) 
Relative 
influence 
score 
(Journal) 
Country 
1 QUARTERLY  JOURNAL 
OF ECONOMICS 
0033-5533 5.00621 0.746 15.66488 UNITED STATES 
2 ECONOMETRICA 0012-9682 3.5461 0.5965 12.93378 ENGLAND 
3 JOURNAL  OF 
ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE 
0022-0515 6.13387 0.746 11.09115 UNITED STATES 
Source: UEFISCDI. 
 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is the oldest journal of economics 
(first issue in 1886) being published by Harvard University Department of 
Economics. Papers published in this journal were accessed via JSTOR database, 
Google Scholar and Oxford Journals Full Collection 2012. A total amount of 
6,111 papers were available. Journal of Economic Literature is one of the most 
significant academic journals in economics being published since 1963 by the 
American Economic Association. Papers published in this journal were 
accessed via JSTOR database, Google Scholar and ProQuest. A total amount of 
9,084 articles were available for this research. 
The first aim of the research was to identify the frequency of use of the 
term “positive” as a scientific approach (occurrences that refer to other 
meanings such as showing mathematical sense, quantitative or qualitative 
assessments, etc. were removed from research). The second goal of research 
was to find out the most frequent meanings associated with “positive” term. 
Following this objectives, the research identified, in the first instance, items 
containing in text or title the key term “positive theory” and, in the second 
phase, the research was extended by searching papers that contain in text the 
pair “positive”-“normative”. Angela Rogojanu, George Şerban-Oprescu 
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3.2. Research results 
 
3.2.1. Research of the key term “positive theory” 
 
Searching database by term “positive theory” allowed us to identify in the 
two target journals a total amount of 135 papers, 36 published by The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (QJE) and 99 published by the Journal of Economic 
Literature (JEL). Of these, a total of 77 occurences were in the text (22 and 55 
QJE published in JEL), and 58 articles include references to papers containing 
“positive theory” term in their titles (14 published the QJE and 44 in JEL). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Papers that contain “positive theory” 
 
Most cited papers that contain the term “positive theory” are: E. von Bohm 
Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital and Interest, R. Thaler, Toward a Positive 
Theory of Consumer Choice, Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, A Positive 
Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model, A. Alesina and Tabellini G., 
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy and 
Ole Hagen, Towards A Positive Theory of Preferences Under Risk. The total 
amount of citations to these papers is presented in the chart below. 
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Figure 2. Most cited papers with title containing “positive theory” 
 
3.2.2. Analysis of “positive”-“normative” dyad 
 
The research of total occurrences of “positive”-“normative” dyad ino 
target journals led to the identification of a total of 253 papers (151 in QJE and 
102 in JEL). These papers have been the subject of a in-depth analysis of the 
context in which “positive”-“normative” dyad is used. Papers were classified 
into three distinct categories: 
I. Papers in which “positive” term is either defined or explicitly 
associated with a meaning. 
II. Works in which “positive” and “normative” terms are used without 
being defined or explicitly assigned with a significance. 
III. Papers in which only the „normative” term is present as opposite to 
“positive” 
The distribution of papers into the three defined categories is presented in 
the chart below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of papers into the defined categories 
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For the items falling in the first category, the research involved identifying 
the most common significances associated to “positive” terms. Furthermore, for 
this papers the total amount citations in JStor and Google Scholar data bases were 
quantified in order to investigate how these associations were spread among 
scholars. The first 10 papers are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 2  
Significances to “positive” term 
No Author  Title  Journal-
year 
Associated 
significance 
JSTOR 
citations 
Google Scholar 
citations 
1 Donald  N. 
McCloskey 
The Rhetoric of 
Economics 
JEL-
1983 
Scientific
Facts 
Objective 
Vigorous 
Precise 
46 2417 
2  Israel M. Kirzner Entrepreneurial 
Discovery and the 
Competitive Market 
Process: An Austrian 
Approach 
JEL-
1997 
Entrepreneurial 
knowledge 
34 1832 
3  Paul J. H. 
Schoemaker 
The Expected Utility 
Model: Its Variants, 
Purposes, Evidence and 
Limitations 
JEL-
1982 
Popper 
falsificationism 
22 1131 
4 Burton  A. 
Weisbrod 
The Health Care 
Quadrilemma: An Essay 
on Technological 
Change, Insurance, 
Quality of Care, and 
Cost Containment 
JEL-
1991 
“What it is” 24 621 
5  Melvin W. Reder Chicago Economics: 
Permanence and 
Change 
JEL-
1982 
Descriptive 16 448 
6 Lazear,  Edward 
P. 
Economic Imperialism QJE-
2000 
Predictive 4 399 
7 Daniel  M. 
Hausman and 
Michael S. 
McPherson 
Taking Ethics Seriously: 
Economics and 
Contemporary Moral 
Philosophy 
JEL-
1993 
Descriptive 18 389 
8 Lawrence  A. 
Boland 
A Critique of Friedman's 
Critics 
JEL-
1979 
Correspondence 
rules between 
reality and theory 
19 310 
9  Victor R. Fuchs, 
Alan B. Krueger 
and James M. 
Poterba 
Economists' Views about 
Parameters, Values, and 
Policies: Survey Results 
in Labor and Public 
Economics 
JEL-
1998 
Without value 
judgments 
10 304 
10 Robin  Marris 
and Dennis C. 
Mueller 
The Corporation, 
Competition, and the 
Invisible Hand 
JEL-
1980 
Rigorous
Test 
Consistent with 
empirical 
observation 
21 227 
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The analysis revealed that the most frequent significances assigned to 
“positive” term are the “descriptive”, “what is it” or “empirical”. These 
meanings are consistent with positivist approach. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Significances to „positive” term 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This study reveals that for a long period of time (1889-1931), most papers 
made appeal to “positive” term in close correlation with positive theory of 
capital and interest developed by Bohm-Bawerk. Thus, the term “positive 
theory”, although rooted in current positivist science, was brough to light in 
economic papers by the Austrian theory. On the other hand, there is an 
interesting paper published in 1901 which is distinct among many references to 
the positive theory of capital and interest. This paper, published by Frederick B. 
Hawley, provides one of the first definitions of economics in a scientific 
journal. In a clear positivist tradition, Hawley suggests a positive definition of 
economics: “Economics is the study of the interrelations of that group of 
egoistic human activities which are called into combined action by the 
expectation of a definite personal share of the purchasing power resulting from 
their joint activity; and of their outer relations or how these activities and their 
results are affected by the physical, ethical, and social environment, and by 
changes in the environment” (Hawley, 1901). The positivism faith in purely 
descriptive role of economics is revealed also by F.H. Knight who, referring to 
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objective standards of utility, states that “[...] Any other view carries us at once 
into an evaluation of the values of one individual by those of another, or by 
some absolute standard, which is unavoidable in the normative sciences of 
ethics and aesthetics, but will not do in a descriptive science of economics” 
(Knight, 1917, p. 70). Also, two of the most important papers published in the 
30's in The Quarterly Journal of Economics are critics of the positivist 
movement against Lionel Robbins's essay, “The Nature and Significance of 
Economics”. First, T. Parsons notes that in his attempt to free positive 
economics from any metaphysical temptation, Robbins is close to radical 
positivist approach that eliminates the nature and significance of economics 
(Parsons, 1934, p. 514). Economics could keep its positive approach if all its 
abstract statements can be identified empirically in reality (Parsons, 1934,   
p. 519). In addition, positive economics assumes that there are rules which “can 
be expressed in terms of the balance equations. They are abstractions to be 
combined with other items to provide a complete explanation of reality” 
(Parsons, 1934, p. 520). Finally, Parsons concludes that economics cannot 
become a positive science by a simple analogy with physics (Parsons, 1934,  
p. 521). On the other hand, R.W. Souter argues against Robbins's view 
according to which normative is synonymous with ethical and stresses out that 
normative economics is different from ethics. Normative economics does not 
investigate the ethical content of an end in itself, it only borrows from 
philosophy an abstract ethical concept (e.g. social profit maximization) in order 
to find out the particular conditions in which that goal can be achieved (Souter, 
1933, pp. 401-402). In traditional economy drawn by Robbins, positive 
approach refers only to individual behavior guided only by its rational rules 
(Souter, 1933, p. 390). Neverthelss the ultimate goal of economics is “the 
organic integration positive economics with normative view [...]” (Souter, 1933, 
p. 388). 
Starting with macroeconomic approach that followed Keynesian theory, 
the positivist view was spreaded via the following assumption: the aim of 
positive economics is to analyze “what is” as opposed to normative approach 
that focuses on “what should be”. An example of this assumption is provided by 
the following statement found in one of the most influential articles on the labor 
market: “The distinction between positive and normative economics is, in 
principle, as clear cut as the difference between the questions of “What is?” and 
“What ought to be?“ (Cain, 1976, p. 849). This approach is reinforced by the 
belief of some scholars that economics has become the study of the price Meanings and spreading patterns of the “positive” concept in economic thought 
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mechanism using mathematical, deductive and positive methods (Miller, 1997, 
p. 1173) and economic theory is a tool for modeling and understanding human 
behavior (Samuelson, 1997, p. 77). 
However, there is a significant body of economics that tries to further 
extend positive economics beyond the strictly descriptive-empirical tradition. 
A particular paper that draws the attention of epistemologists is that of Donald 
N. McCloskey, The rhetoric of economics. According to McCloskey, positive 
science is the result of a series of contributions made in the following 
sequence Carnap-Kuhn-Popper-Lakatos-Feyerabend (McCloskey, 1983, p. 493). 
McCloskey conducts a contrastive analysis of positive and normative terms 
showing that positive approach is associated with concepts such as scientific, 
factual, objective, robust, accurate, things, cognition, strong, while normative 
approach is associated with terms like humanist, opinion, subjective, imprecise, 
vague words, intuition, soft (McCloskey, 1983, p. 510). 
Therefore, in the twentieth century positivism moved far away from one 
or another science and became isolated in elitist metaphysics of the great intel-
lectuals, but “positive economics” and quantitative analysis gradually conque-
red research, publications, universities and scientific awards. In the ocean of 
quantitative analysis “expicationist” researchers seem lost wandering souls, 
disappointed by the low position of fundamental disciplines in universities 
compared to disciplines that measure and quantify (Vaughn, 1993, p. 174). 
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